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In the past decade, there has been growing interest in the neuroanatomical and
neuropsychological bases of reappraisal. Findings suggest that reappraisal activates a set of
areas in the left hemisphere (LH), which are commonly associated with language abilities
and verbally mediated cognitive control. The main goal of this study was to investigate
whether individuals with focal damage to the LH (n = 8) were more markedly impaired on
a reappraisal generation task than individuals with right hemisphere lesions (RH, n = 8),
and healthy controls (HC, n = 14). The reappraisal generation task consisted of a set of ten
pictures from the IAPS, depicting negative events of different sorts. Participantswere asked
to quickly generate as many positive reinterpretations as possible for each picture. Two
scores were derived from this task, namely difﬁculty and productivity. A second goal of this
study was to explore which cognitive control processes were associated with performance
on the reappraisal task. For this purpose, participants were assessed on several measures
of cognitive control. Findings indicated that reappraisal difﬁculty – deﬁned as the time
taken to generate a ﬁrst reappraisal – did not differ between LH and RH groups. However,
differences were found between patients with brain injury (LH + RH) and HC, suggesting
that brain damage in either hemisphere inﬂuences reappraisal difﬁculty. No differences in
reappraisal productivity were found across groups, suggesting that neurological groups
and HC are equally productive when time constraints are not considered. Finally, only
two cognitive control processes inhibition and verbal ﬂuency- were inversely associated
with reappraisal difﬁculty. Implications for the neuroanatomical and neuropsychological
bases of reappraisal generation are discussed, and implications for neuro-rehabilitation are
considered.
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INTRODUCTION
Emotion dysregulation has been long recognized as a common
impairment after focal and diffuse brain damage, compromis-
ing emotional adjustment, and social functioning (Tate, 1999;
Bechara, 2004; Obonsawin et al., 2007; Abreu et al., 2009; McDon-
ald et al., 2010). However, little is known about the mechanisms
that underlie such impairment. The process model of emotion
regulation (ER; Gross, 1998, 2014; Gross and Thompson, 2007)
suggests the existence of a set of ﬁve mechanisms, called strategies,
that people commonly use to modulate how they feel. Recently, it
has been proposed that these strategiesmay be selectively impaired
in groups of patients with damage to discrete brain areas (Beer and
Lombardo, 2007).
Reappraisal is an ER strategy of special interest to under-
stand emotion dysregulation after brain injury. It refers to the
capacity to modify the meaning of a situation in order to manip-
ulate its emotional impact (Gross, 1998; Gross and Thompson,
2007), this by re-interpreting the event in less negative, or more
positive, terms (Ochsner and Gross, 2007; Mcrae et al., 2012a).
This capacity to manipulate emotion through the use of reap-
praisal has been referred to as reappraisal ability. Most behavioral
and neuroimaging studies on reappraisal have focused on this
global ability, without directly considering the assessment of peo-
ple’s capacity to produce new interpretations of negative events
(reappraisal generation). Such emphasis on ability is sensible, con-
sidering that people with healthy brains probably have an intact
capacity to generate reappraisals. However, individuals with brain
damage, particularly to the prefrontal cortex, are often impaired
in the generation and manipulation of thoughts (Goldstein, 1936;
Goldstein and Scherer, 1941; Luria, 1966; Gomez Beldarrain
et al., 2005). If reappraisal relies on the ﬂexible use of thinking
(Ochsner and Gross, 2004), then it is likely that people with brain
injury may struggle using such strategy to modulate how they
feel.
From a neuropsychological point of view, it has been suggested
that reappraisal depends on capacities like inhibition (to inhibit the
current negative appraisal and generate a new one) and language
(to generate a narrative or history to tell oneself; Mcrae et al.,
2012b). These abilities are frequently compromised after lesions
to the left hemisphere (LH; Luria, 1959, 1966; Mecklinger et al.,
1999; Alexander et al., 2007; Morin, 2009; Robinson et al., 2010;
Geva et al., 2011; Coelho et al., 2012).
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Neuroimaging studies on reappraisal appear to support the rel-
evance of the LH. It has been reported that reappraisal is closely
associated to the activation of cognitive control and language
areas, particularly in the left PFC (Ochsner et al., 2002, 2004;
Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Green and Malhi, 2006; Goldin et al.,
2008; Kalisch, 2009; Kim et al., 2011; Vanderhasselt et al., 2012).
To our knowledge there is only one case study that has explored
how damage to the LH (a fronto-parietal lesion), and impairment
to cognitive control and language areas, is related to reappraisal
generation difﬁculties (Salas et al., 2013). However, no group study
has tested whether unilateral lesions to the LH have a larger impact
on reappraisal generation compared to right hemisphere (RH)
lesions.
Finally, researchers have begun to unpack the cognitive con-
trol processes associated with reappraisal in non-brain injured
subjects. It has been suggested that working memory, response
inhibition, abstract reasoning, and verbal ﬂuency may be neces-
sary to reappraise (Mcrae et al., 2012b). Nevertheless, evidence has
only supported a relationship betweenworkingmemory and reap-
praisal ability (Schmeichel et al., 2008; Mcrae et al., 2012b). The
study of people with brain damage may contribute to this line of
research by exploring whether impairment in a speciﬁc neuropsy-
chological capacity (e.g., verbal ﬂuency) is related to reappraisal
generation ability.
This is the ﬁrst study to experimentally test whether lesion lat-
erality has an effect on reappraisal generation. In addition, this
study is also the ﬁrst to explore the relationship between cognitive
control impairment and the capacity to generate reappraisals. For
this purpose, participantswith unilateral lesions to the left andRH,
and matched healthy controls, were tested on a reappraisal gen-
eration task. In order to obtain a proﬁle of neuropsychological
impairment, a set of cognitive tasks was administered. Addi-
tionally, measures of emotional symptomatology and ER were
collected.
Based on the available literature, this article explored two
hypothesis: (1) that participants with LH lesions will present a
more marked impairment generating reappraisal compared to
subjectswithRH lesions and controls (LHReappraisalHypothesis);
(2) that cognitive control abilities, such as, response inhibition,
working memory, verbal ﬂuency, and abstraction will be nega-
tively associated to reappraisal difﬁculty and positively associated
to reappraisal productivity (see Cognitive Control Hypothesis).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Participants with unilateral lesions and healthy controls were
referred by neurologists from the School of Psychology at Ban-
gor University, this after ethical approval was obtained from the
same institution and the Betsi Cadwaladr University Health Board
(Wales, UK). The main inclusion criterion for the neurologi-
cal group was to have a unilateral focal brain lesion. Several
exclusion criteria were considered, such as time since injury (no
less than 6 months) and language ability (no severe language
impairment).
The overall sample involved a total of 30 participants, including
individuals with left hemisphere damage (LH, n = 8, female = 4,
male = 4), right hemisphere damage (RH, n = 8, female = 5,
male= 3), andhealthy controls (HC,n= 14, female= 9,male= 5).
No differences were found between the three groups in terms of
age [LH: M = 62.83, SD = 9.98; RH: M = 57.43, SD = 13.34; HC:
M = 62.86, SD = 4.28; F(2,28) = 0.31, p = 0.73] or education
[LH: M = 12.83, SD = 1.3; RH: M = 14.14, SD = 1.3; HC:
M = 14, SD = 1.8; F(2,28) = 0.16, p = 0.85]. In addition, both
neurological groups showed no signiﬁcant differences in terms
of months since the injury [LH: M = 69.16, SD = 49.19; RH:
M = 63.22, SD = 44.35; t(14), p = 0.47]. For details on lesion
location and etiology see Table 1.
PROCEDURE
Healthy controls and participants with brain injury were tested
at Bangor University. In cases where participants with acquired
brain injury had mobility problems or could not travel, they were
seen at home. Eligible participants were seen twice. Assessment
across two sessions was useful to avoid the impact of fatigue
on the neurological group. During the ﬁrst session the general
goal of the research was explained and consent was obtained.
Measures of overall cognition were also collected. In the second
session the reappraisal task was carried and measures of execu-
tive function were obtained. Finally participants were debriefed.
The complete assessment process was carried by a clinical neu-
ropsychologist. Only the reappraisal task was administered using a
computer.
Instruments
Overall cognitive assessment. Several tasks were used in order
to obtain a general proﬁle of cognitive functioning. The Mini
Mental State Examination (Rovner and Folstein, 1987) was used
as a basic screening for cognitive impairment. The capacity to
sustain attention and divide attentional resources between tasks
was assessed using the Telephone Search (TEA, Robertson et al.,
1994). The ability to comprehend verbal instructions was mea-
sured using the Token Test (De Renzi and Faglioni, 1978). A
logic memory task (Wechsler, 1987) was used to assess partic-
ipants’ capacity to register and recall new verbal information.
Similarly, the Rey-Osterrieth Figure (Stern et al., 1994) was used to
assess visual memory as well as visuo-spatial abilities. Finally, the
Frontal Assessment Battery (Dubois et al., 2000) was employed as
a screening for executive abilities.
Cognitive control assessment. A set of neuropsychological tasks
was used to obtain a proﬁle of several cognitive control abilities:
(a) Workingmemory was measured using digits forward and back-
ward (Wechsler, 1981). In the digit forward task participants
listened to a series of single-digit numbers and repeat them in
the same order. The number of digits in each series increased
from 2 to 9. The digit backward task had the same structure,
but the participant repeated the numbers in reverse order.
(b) Abstraction ability was assessed using the similarities task
(Wechsler, 1981), where participants are instructed to think
in which way two items are alike (e.g., boat/car: “means of
transport”).
(c) Verbal ﬂuency was measured using a subtask from the D-KEFS
(Delis et al., 2001). Here, participants had to initiate a verbal
response and retrieve speciﬁc information in accordance with
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Table 1 | Clinical details of left hemisphere and right hemisphere groups.
Lesion latrality Age/Sex Etiology Months since onset Location
Left hemisphere 52 F MCA stroke 104 Left prefrontal
76 F MCA stroke 25 Left prefrontal, insula
64 F MCA stroke 129 Left temporo-parietal
76 M MCA stroke 65 Left temporo-parietal
49 M Herpes encephalitis 24 Left hippocampus, amygdala, insula
59 M MCA stroke 48 Left temporo-parietal
57 M MCA stroke 126 Left temporo-parietal
72 M MCA stroke 72 Left fronto-parietal
Right hemisphere 57 F MCA stroke 84 Right prefrontal, insula
50 M MCA and ACA stroke 20 Right prefrontal
45 M ACoA SAH 70 Right prefrontal
74 M MCA Stroke 20 Right ventro-lateral prefrontal cortex, basal ganglia
46 F MCA stroke 114 Right prefrontal, insula
66 F MCA stroke 120 Right parietal
78 F MCA stroke 13 Right prefrontal insula
68 F MCA stroke 24 Right prefrontal and parietal
ACoA, anterior communicating artery aneurism; SAH, subarachnoid haemorrhage; MCA, middle cerebral artery; ACA, anterior cerebral artery.
speciﬁc rules (e.g., in 1 min, say as many words as you can
think of that start with the letter “a”).
(d) Inhibition ability was assessed using three measures: a conﬂic-
iting instructions task (Stuss and Benson, 1986), an inhibitory
control task (Drewe, 1975) and an environmental autonomy
task (Lhermitte et al., 1986). In the conﬂicting instructions
task participants must provide an opposite response to the
examiner’s alternating signals, following verbal command and
withholding automatic responses based on visual input (e.g.,
tapping once when the examiner taps twice). In the inhibitory
control task subjects must inhibit a response that was previ-
ously given to the same stimulus (e.g., no tapping when the
examiner taps twice). In the environmental autonomy task
individuals must inhibit the activation of patterns of behavior
triggered by sensory stimuli (e.g., the participants places his
hands on top of the examiner’s while he receives the following
instruction: “do not hold my hands”).
Emotional functioning assessment. In order to assess the pres-
ence of symptomatology, the Hospital Anxiety and Depression
scale (HADS; Zigmond and Snaith, 1983), a self-report question-
naire, was employed. TheHADShas demonstrated to be a sensitive
tool to assess depression and anxiety symptoms in acquired brain
injury population (Dawkins et al., 2006). To assess the use of reap-
praisal in daily life, the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross
and John, 2003) was administered.
Reappraisal generation task
This task is adapted from several studies on reappraisal ability,
and is described in detail in Salas et al. (2013). 10 pictures1 were
1Pictures’ theme and IAPS number: Riot (2691), Shoplifting (2745), Sick baby
(3350), Burnt building (9471), Funeral (2799), Tornado (5971), Pollution (9341),
selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS;
Lang et al., 2008), depicting negative events of different sorts.
These pictures were selected to cover the wide range of possi-
ble negative scenarios that people commonly face (death, natural
disasters, accidents, illness, violence, etc.). The pictures were
displayed in a 14′ computer screen.
At the beginning of the task participants were trained to gen-
erate reappraisals, using three practice IAPS pictures (not part of
the set of 10 test pictures). The task was introduced as follows:
“Sometimes people try to feel better by looking on the bright
side of things. You will watch pictures of negative events and
will be asked to think aloud about the positive side of these sit-
uations. Try to be fast and say as many positive sides you can
think of.”
In order to avoid memory bias for the neurological group,
on the computer screen, above each picture, the task instruc-
tion was summarized: “Think aloud about the positive side of
this situation. Try to be quick.” Participants were informed that
their answers would be timed, and recorded verbatim. They were
also informed that the aim of the task was to produce as many
positive reinterpretations as possible. If they were not able to
generate a correct reappraisal for the ﬁrst picture, several reap-
praisal examples were offered [e.g., Car Crash (9903): “when
looking at this picture some people say that help is on the way”
or “is not as bad as it looks”]. The same procedure was followed
with the second and third practice pictures. Both the neurolog-
ical group and the non-brain injured group were able to offer
adequate reappraisals by the end of the three-picture practice
phase.
Flood (9926), Car crash (9903), Graveyard (9220). The picture set had an overall
negative valence (M = 3.01; SD = 0.8) according to the IAPS database.
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DATA ANALYSIS
In order to test Hypothesis 1 (that participants with LH lesions will
present a more marked impairment generating reappraisals com-
pared to subjects with RH lesions and controls), two variables were
generated, following a similar analysis to the one used by Salas et al.
(2013). Reappraisal difﬁculty was obtained averaging the number
of seconds that each subject required to offer the ﬁrst reappraisal
in each picture. Reappraisal productivity was measured by averag-
ing the number of spontaneous reappraisal (with no prompting)
generated during each picture. The two variables were compared
between groups. Because normality and independence of variance
assumptions were not met, a non-parametric test for differences
between 3 or more groups (Kruskal–Wallis) was used. If the over-
allmodel showed signiﬁcant differences, twoplanned comparisons
were tested using Mann-Whitney test [healthy controls vs. brain
injury patients (left + right hemisphere); LH vs. RH].
Hypothesis 2 (that cognitive control abilities would be nega-
tively associated to reappraisal difﬁculty, and positively related to
reappraisal productivity) was addressed using correlational meth-
ods. As a ﬁrst step, bivariate correlations were used to explore
independent associations between reappraisal difﬁculty and reap-
praisal productivity with cognitive control abilities. As a second
step, a multiple linear regression model was tested. From the seven
initial tasks considered to assess the four cognitive processes, three
were dropped. Two of them, related to inhibition (sensitivity to
interference and environmental autonomy), did not show enough
variability (most of the participants performed with the highest
score). The two ﬂuidity tasks (letter ﬂuency and category ﬂuency)
showed a medium correlation between them (r = 0.5, p = 0.01).
In consequence, category ﬂuidity was dropped in order to decrease
the number of parameters and avoid possible multincollinearity.
The decision to preserve letter ﬂuency was based on evidence sug-
gesting that, compared to category ﬂuency, it is more strongly
associated to cognitive control abilities (Henry and Crawford,
2004).
RESULTS
COGNITIVE AND EMOTIONAL FUNCTIONING
A detailed description of the average scores of each group on the
cognitive and emotional assessment can be found in Table 2. In
relation to emotional functioning, it is interesting that all three
groups had subclinical levels of anxiety (LH:M = 3.67; RH:M = 5;
HC:M = 4.64) and depression (LH:M = 4.33; RH:M = 4.75; HC:
M = 2.71). Nevertheless, compared to healthy controls, individ-
uals with brain injury presented signiﬁcantly higher scores in the
depression scale (p = 0.039). In addition, none of the neurological
groups differed from healthy controls in the self-reported use of
reappraisal [F(2,22) = 2.38, p = 0.11].
In relation to cognitive functioning, individuals with brain
damage differed signiﬁcantly fromhealthy controls in almost every
Table 2 | Cognitive and emotional performance of neurological groups and healthy controls.
Task LH Group RH Group HC Group HC vs. BI LH vs. RH
M SD M SD M SD
Overall cognition Minimental state examination 25.67 2.88 27.83 1.60 29.17 1.34 p = 0.001*** p = 0.066
Sustained attention (TEA) 7.67 1.52 7.83 1.83 11.00 1.78 p < 0.001*** p = 0.478
Divided attention (TEA) 9.00 3.60 11.16 5.11 11.22 1.73 p = 0.083 p = 0.488
Comprehensive language (token test) 26.00 9.53 31.17 1.17 31.33 0.78 p = 0.039* p = 0.098
Memory (WMS-R) coding 6.67 2.50 13.00 3.84 14.58 2.97 p = 0.033* p = 0.131
Memory (WMS-R) free recall 8.67 3.05 14.00 4.33 16.83 3.51 p = 0.14* p = 0.171
Memory (WMS-R) recognition 13.67 0.57 13.33 1.36 13.75 1.60 p = 0.19 p = 0.573
Executive functions (FAB total) 13.33 4.04 15.50 0.23 17.08 0.99 p = 0.022* p = 0.367
Cognitive control Working memory (digits, WAIS) 10.00 4.58 9.17 2.56 10.67 2.31 p = 0.022* p = 0.664
Inhibition, sensitivity to interference 2.83 0.41 2.63 0.51 2.91 0.30 p = 0.067 p = 0.841
Inhibition, inhibitory control 2.00 1.92 2.50 0.92 2.58 0.79 p = 0.205 p = 0.383
Inhibition, environmental autonomy 3.00 0.00 2.83 0.40 3.00 0.00 p = 0.433 p = 0.461
Verbal ﬂuency (DKEF-S) letter 7.67 5.13 7.50 2.43 10.71 3.27 p = 0.006** p = 0.910
Verbal ﬂuency (DKEF-S) category 4.33 0.57 8.00 2.09 10.73 2.19 p < 0.001*** p = 0.003**
Abstraction (similarities,WAIS) 6.67 2.08 10.00 3.69 11.64 3.50 p = 0.013*** p = 0.423
Emotional functioning Emotional symptoms (HADS) anxiety 3.33 0.57 6.17 4.04 4.27 3.52 p = 0.14 p = 0.431
Emotional symptoms (HADS) depression 4.00 6.92 6.00 5.40 2.55 1.86 p = 0.039* p = 0.305
Emotion regulation (ERQ) reappraisal 23.67 14.50 33.00 4.19 32.00 5.07 p = 0.16 p = 0.091
Individuals with brain injury (BI) present signiﬁcant differences on most of the cognitive measures when compared to healthy control (HC).The left hemisphere group
(LH) only differs from the right hemisphere group (RH) on categorical verbal ﬂuency.The two columns of the right present the level of signiﬁcance of these differences.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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measure, with the exception of divided attention (p = 0.083),
memory recall (recognition; p = 0.19), inhibitory control
(p = 0.20) and environmental autonomy (p = 0.43). Marginal
differences (p = 0.067) were found on another measure of inhibi-
tion, sensitivity to interference. It is interesting to note that, when
comparing the performance of both brain injured groups, no sig-
niﬁcant differences were found across all cognitive measures, with
the exception of category ﬂuidity (p = 0.003), where people with
LH lesions obtained lower scores.
LATERALITY HYPOTHESIS
Reappraisal difﬁculty
The average number of seconds taken to generate a ﬁrst reappraisal
did not differ between the LHandRHgroups. However, signiﬁcant
differences were found between patients with brain injury in gen-
eral (LH + RH), and HC. A Kruskal–Wallis non-parametric test
was used to compare the time taken by each group. It was observed
that the number of seconds was signiﬁcantly different between
groups [H(2) = 10.77, p = 0.002; mean ranking : LH = 21.71,
RH = 18.25, HC = 9.79]. According to planned comparisons,
it was found that this difference was only signiﬁcant, and had
a large effect size, between the HC group and the brain injury
group (LH + RH; U = 32, Z = −3.19, p < 0.001, r = 0.59),
but not signiﬁcant, and with a negligible effect size, between LH
and RH groups (U = 25, Z = −0.24, p = 0.43, r = −0.04).
In conclusion, our ﬁndings do not support the LH Reappraisal
Hypothesis, for patients with LH and RH damage were equally
slowed in generating reappraisals.
Reappraisal productivity
The average number of reappraisals generated for each picture did
not differ between groups, suggesting that individuals with LH
and RH lesions, and healthy controls, are equally productive when
time is not considered. A Kruskal–Wallis non-parametric test was
used to compare the total reappraisals generated by each group. It
was observed that the number of reappraisals was not signiﬁcantly
different between groups [H(2) = 3.51, p = 0.175; mean ranking :
LH = 14.07, RH = 10.88, HC = 17.82]. A detailed description
of the groups’ performance can be found in Table 3. A graphic
summary of the results can also be found in Figure 1.
COGNITIVE CONTROL HYPOTHESIS
Reappraisal difﬁculty
From the four cognitive control processes considered, only two
(inhibition and verbal ﬂuency) were signiﬁcantly associated with
reappraisal difﬁculty. The ﬁnal model tested had reappraisal
FIGURE 1 | Laterality and reappraisal generation.The ﬁgures describe
differences between neurological groups and controls in reappraisal
difﬁculty and productivity. Patients with left hemisphere and right
hemisphere lesions are equally slow generating the ﬁrst reappraisal (top
ﬁgure). However, they do not differ from controls in the average number of
reappraisal produced in each picture (bottom ﬁgure), **p < 0.001.
difﬁculty as a dependent variable and working memory, abstrac-
tion, verbal ﬂuency, and inhibition as predictors. Multicollinearity,
homoscedasticity, and independency of errors assumptions were
met. The model was signiﬁcant [F(4,24) = 7.70, p < 0.001]
and explained a 49% of the variance. The ﬁnal model is pre-
sented in Table 4. From the four predictors, inhibition and verbal
ﬂuency were the only two signiﬁcantly associated to reappraisal
difﬁculty. By looking at the standard coefﬁcient it is possible to
conclude that Inhibition showed the strongest predictive value.
In relation to the other two independent variables, abstraction
Table 3 | Descriptive statistics of reappraisal generation and productivity, for both neurological groups and healthy controls.
LH Group RH Group BI Group HC
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Reappraisal difﬁculty 43.3 25.88 33.58 17.6 38.13** 21.62 16.7 7.07
Reappraisal productivity 1.82 0.59 1.61 0.95 1.71 0.78 2.22 0.79
**p < 0.001.
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Table 4 | Multiple linear regression model for reappraisal difficulty.
Unstandardized coefficients Standardized coefficients
B Standard error B t Significant
(Constant) 87.12 12.59 6.92 0.00
Working memory (digits) 0.26 0.93 0.04 0.28 0.78
Abstraction (similarities) −1.64 0.87 −0.27 −1.88 0.07
Verbal ﬂuency (letter) −2.28 0.9 −0.37 −2.53 0.02*
Inhibition (inhibitory control) −10.27 3.07 −0.47 −3.35 0.003*
The table describes the percentage of variance explained by each cognitive control process. Inhibition and verbal ﬂuency are the only two signiﬁcant variables.
Abstraction presents a marginal relationship with reappraisal difﬁculty. *p < 0.05.
was marginally related and working memory showed no
relationship.
Reappraisal productivity
The same model was tested for reappraisal productivity. Con-
trary to the previous model, this one was not signiﬁcant [adjusted
R2 = 0.022, F(4,24) = 1.16, p = 0.35].
RESULTS SUMMARY
Findings do not support the Laterality Hypothesis, challenging the
assumption that LH lesions generate a more marked impairment
in the generation of a ﬁrst reappraisal (reappraisal difﬁculty) or
the total number of reappraisal that can be produced (reappraisal
productivity). Nevertheless, the results of this study suggest that
having a brain injury in either hemisphere does have an impact
on reappraisal difﬁculty. This pattern is not observed in relation
to reappraisal productivity, where participants with brain injury
reach similar levels than controls. In conclusion, participants with
brain injury are slower, but equally productive than people with
no brain injury when time constrains are not considered.
The results of this study appear to support the Cognitive Con-
trol Hypothesis, suggesting that the velocity to generate a ﬁrst
reappraisal, which is compromised in brain-injured patients in
general, is associated with two cognitive control abilities. Thus,
inhibition and verbal ﬂuency present both negative relationships
to reappraisal difﬁculty. Regarding abstraction, it only exhibits
a marginally signiﬁcant negative association. Working memory
does not appear to be associated to the amount of time required
to reappraise. Interestingly, no cognitive control variable appears
to be associated to reappraisal productivity.
DISCUSSION
In the past decade, there has been a growing interest in examining
the neuroanatomical basis of reappraisal via neuroimaging. These
studies have suggested that reappraisal tasks activate a set of areas
in the LH that are commonly associated with language and cog-
nitive control. The goal of this study was to answer two questions
that ﬂow from this observation. (1) Are participants with unilat-
eral lesions to the LH more impaired than participants with RH
lesions and neurologically healthy controls on a reappraisal gen-
eration task? (2) Which cognitive control abilities are associated
with reappraisal generation?
Hemispheric laterality and reappraisal generation
Our focus in this study was reappraisal generation, or the capac-
ity to produce positive reinterpretations of negative events. This
is an important point to clarify, because most behavioral and
neuroimaging studies to date have focused on reappraisal ability,
or the capacity to modulate emotion through the use of reap-
praisal. Such emphasis on ability is sensible, considering that
people with healthy brains probably have an intact capacity to
generate reappraisals. However, a robust set of evidence on the
neuropsychological consequences of brain injury suggests that the
generation and manipulation of thoughts can be compromised by
lesions to diverse brain areas (Goldstein and Scherer, 1941; Luria,
1966;McGrath,1991; GomezBeldarrain et al., 2005). If reappraisal
relies on the ﬂexible use of thinking (Ochsner and Gross, 2004),
then it is likely that people with brain injury may struggle using
such strategy to modulate how they feel.
Data from this study suggest that lesions to the LH, which
has been long related to language functions (Frost et al., 1999;
Corballis et al., 2012), and verbally mediated cognitive control
(Stephan et al., 2003; Gruber and Goschke, 2004; Henry and
Crawford, 2004), do not impair reappraisal generation more than
lesions to the RH. This is interesting, since reappraisal has been
mostly considered as a language- mediated ER strategy (Gross
and Thompson, 2007; Mcrae et al., 2012a). A possible explanation
for this negative ﬁnding may be related to the fact that LH and
RH groups presented a similar proﬁle of cognitive impairment
(see Table 2). It is also possible that individuals with RH lesions
presented low scores on reappraisal difﬁculty as a consequence
of impairment of other non-language mechanisms, for instance,
attention. According to our data, both groups are impairedon their
ability to sustain attention, a deﬁcit that is commonly expressed in
everyday life as distractibility (Leclercq et al., 2002). If reappraisal
involves the manipulation of attentional focus (Ochsner et al.,
2002), it is possible that attentional deﬁcits may have an impact
on reappraisal generation. However, this explanation remains
speculative and requires scientiﬁc exploration.
An alternative explanation for this negative ﬁnding may well
be related to the small sample size of the study. Even though
there is a small difference between LH and RH groups, sug-
gesting that people with LH lesions are slower than RH indi-
viduals generating reappraisals, this does not appear signiﬁcant.
In addition, this negative ﬁnding may also be interpreted in
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view of the unbalanced distribution -inside each neurological
group- between anterior and posterior lesions. In fact, the LH
group presented less individuals with prefrontal damage (ante-
rior = 3, posterior = 5) compared to the RH group (anterior = 7,
posterior = 1), perhaps compromising comprehensive (poste-
rior), and not executive (anterior) aspects of language. In the
future, new studies should consider this variable and generate
experimental designs that include individuals with lesions to
anterior and posterior areas of each hemisphere. Considering
the existing neuroimaging literature on reappraisal (see Intro-
duction), it is possible that damage to the anterior portions
of the LH will have a more marked impact on the capacity to
generate reappraisals than damage to posterior areas of the left
convexity.
Neuropsychological components of reappraisal generation
The available literature on cognitive control and reappraisal is
scarce and focuses exclusively on reappraisal ability. So far, it
has been suggested that reappraisal ability is positively related to
working memory (Schmeichel et al., 2008; Mcrae et al., 2012b)
and marginally related to abstraction (Mcrae et al., 2012b). In
relation to verbal ability (e.g., to generate alternative interpreta-
tions), only one study has found indirect evidence that verbal
ﬂuency is related to reappraisal ability, however, this on a
suppression task (Gyurak et al., 2009). Interestingly, no asso-
ciations have been reported for inhibition, a key theoretical
aspects of reappraisal (e.g., to detach from the negative emotional
experience).
This study suggests that an inhibitory control task (Drewe,
1975), where participants must withhold a response that was given
to the same stimulus before (e.g., tap once when the examiner
taps twice), can signiﬁcantly predict the amount of time that it
takes to generate a ﬁrst reappraisal. In other words, if an indi-
vidual decreases in one point his score in the inhibition task
(Dubois et al., 2000), his response time to generate a ﬁrst reap-
praisal will increase by 10.27 s. This ﬁnding is the ﬁrst to support
the view that inhibition is a key ability in decreasing the salience
of automatic negative appraisals (Mcrae et al., 2012b), for when
inhibition is impaired, reappraisal generation requires consider-
ably more time. There is one case study that has reported this
relationship in detail (Salas et al., 2013), describing how inhi-
bition impairment after a left fronto-parietal lesion produced
a remarkable difﬁculty to spontaneously generate reappraisals.
In addition, this ﬁnding is also consistent with a large litera-
ture associating damage to the left and right PFC with deﬁcits
withholding prepotent responses (Aron et al., 2003, 2004; Swick
et al., 2008). Finally, it is important to note that this data is
also consistent with models of executive function that propose
behavioral inhibition as a requisite to any goal directed behavior
(Barkley, 1997, 2001).
The results obtained in this experiment also suggest that per-
formance on a verbal ﬂuency task (Delis et al., 2001), where
participants are expected to generate as many words that begin
with a letter in one minute, also predict the amount of time taken
to generate a ﬁrst reappraisal (albeit to a less extent than inhibi-
tion). Verbal ﬂuency is an interesting measure to consider in the
context of reappraisal, both because deﬁcits in verbal ﬂuency are
a common feature of prefrontal cortex damage (Henry and Craw-
ford, 2004; Robinson et al., 2012), and also because verbal ﬂuency
presents high associations with verbal ability (Miller, 1984; Craw-
ford et al., 1992, 1993; Sollberger et al., 2010), a core component of
reappraisal (Mcrae et al., 2012b). In addition, verbal ﬂuency also
appears to recruit other processes that are key to reappraisal, such
as the retrieval and recall of information, self- monitoring and
inhibition (Perret, 1974; Henry and Crawford, 2004).
Based on these ﬁndings, and considering data from previous
studies on reappraisal ability, a two-stage reappraisal model may
be proposed (see Figure 2). In a ﬁrst stage (reappraisal generation)
inhibition is required to disengage from the automatic negative
meaning. If inhibition is successful, alternative interpretations,
or new meanings, can be generated -this moderated by verbal
ﬂuency. In addition, and considering previous data (Schmeichel
et al., 2008; Mcrae et al., 2012b), it is also suggested that, during a
second phase (reappraisal maintenance), working memory ability
has a role keeping in mind the recently generated new interpreta-
tion, thus “shielding” it from the initial meaning that still remains
in the focus of attention (Kanske et al., 2010; Gross, 2013). This
model is consistent with the implementation-maintenance model
of reappraisal, IMMO (Kalisch, 2009), which suggests that the
process of reappraisal has early and late components. According
to this model, early components refer to operations needed for
choosing and implementing an initial reappraisal strategy, while
late components are required to maintain a reappraisal in work-
ing memory and monitor its success. Taken together, data from
this lesion study suggests that inhibition and verbal ﬂuency, two
neuropsychological abilities, are critical in implementing an initial
reappraisal strategy during the early phase of the process. Working
memory, on the contrary, seems not to be relevant in generating
(implementing) a reappraisal during the early moments of the
process.
Reappraisal generation impairment and neuropsychological
rehabilitation
This study offers insights into how brain damage may compro-
mise ER. It suggests that brain injury, without regard to lesion
laterality, impairs the capacity to quickly generate positive rein-
terpretations of negative events. However, when longer periods
of time are provided, patients are able to produce reappraisals as
FIGURE 2 | A two-stage process of reappraisal. On a ﬁrst stage
(reappraisal generation) automatic negative meanings are inhibited and
new positive, or less negative, meanings are generated. On the second
stage (reappraisal maintenance) positive, or less negative, new meanings
are kept in mind and protected from competing negative appraisals.
Inhibition and verbal ﬂuency are key abilities for reappraisal generation,
while working memory is central for reappraisal maintenance.
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well as controls. These ﬁndings are relevant to neuropsychological
rehabilitation for two reasons.
First, they offer supporting evidence to the idea that brain-
injured patients in general are vulnerable to experience emotion
dysregulation (Salas, 2012), particularly when confronted to emo-
tional situationswhere they need to react quickly. This is consistent
with studies describing that focal and non-focal brain dam-
age compromises the capacity to rapidly react to environmental
demands (Goldstein, 1995; Gerritsen et al., 2003; Winkens et al.,
2006; Mathias and Wheaton, 2007), and that negative emotional
events can compromise cognitive abilities (e.g., Demanet et al.,
2011).
Second, they suggest that a psychological capacity such as
reappraisal can be externally modulated, this, by manipulating
environmental demands (time). In other words, people with
acquired brain injury are slower than controls, but if enough
time is offered, they are equally able to generate reappraisals, at
least in the case of relatively high-functioning individuals such as
those studied in the present research. This is in line with evidence
proposing that neuropsychological impairments are not stable, but
can be modulated by physical or interpersonal context (Bowen
et al., 2010, for a review). For example, it has been reported that
the use of prompts facilitates the process of disengagement from
negative visual material, increasing dramatically the capacity to
generate positive reinterpretations (Salas et al., 2013). This evi-
dence appears to support the theoretical proposition that extrinsic
forms of ER, such as affective and cognitive engagement (Niven
et al., 2009), can be used to compensate for intrinsic ER difﬁculties
(reappraisal; Freed, 2002; Salas, 2012).
CONCLUSION
In recent years, scientists have become increasingly interested in
the neural bases, and neuropsychological foundations, of ER. This
study contributes to the literature by exploring the role of each
hemisphere, and the relevance of several cognitive control abil-
ities, in reappraisal generation. In addition, and perhaps most
importantly, this study has addressed these issues using a well-
known ER paradigm on a sample of individuals with acquired
brain injury. Such an approach opens important possibilities to
ER research, complementing behavioral and neuroimaging studies
with non-clinical participants.
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